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T HE United States Supreme Court promulgated the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure out of 
growing concern about abuse of the civil litigation process. The 
most controversial aspect of the implementation of these revi-
sions has been judicial enforcement of amended Rule 11 (the 
Rule) in ways that disadvantage or "chill" 1 civil rights plaintiffs 
and attorneys. 2 As the federal judiciary enters its eighth year of 
implementing the Rule, courts apparently have improved their 
application of it by becoming more solicitous of the needs of civil 
• Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank George 
Cochran, Barry Nakell, Peggy Hesse and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, 
the Harris Trust for continuing generous support, and Cecelia Palmer and Bev-
erly Stevenson for processing this piece. 
I. "Chilling effects" are inappropriate effects that discourage possibly legit-
imate lawsuits. The effects are attributable to various factors including the 
Rule's overly vigorous enforcement, resource restraints on civil rights plaintiffs, 
and the non-traditional nature of civil rights litigation. Civil rights litigation 
consists of lawsuits to enforce values and commands involving civil rights in the 
Constitution and such civil rights legislation as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The deficient 
resources of many civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys make them risk averse and 
particularly susceptible to being chilled. For an examination of these concepts, 
see Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 485, 495-98 
(1988-89). 
2. Rule 11 (the Rule) requires that judges sanction attorneys and litigants 
who fail to conduct reasonable prefiling inquiries. FED. R. C1v. P. 11. These 
sanctions are the focus of this article. The Rule also prohibits papers interposed 
for inappropriate purposes. Because relatively few judges have employed that 
provision and it has less potential for chilling legitimate lawsuits, it will not be 
treated here. 
(105) 
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rights plaintiffs and their counsel, in recognition of the important 
social function that civil rights litigation fulfills in combatting 
discrimination. 
The first section of this article briefly examines the Rule's 
early implementation and the disadvantages that enforcement 
had for civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys. The second section 
analyzes recent developments suggesting that judicial application 
of the Rule has improved. Precisely how widespread such en-
forcement actually has been or will become is unclear. These 
complications prevent definitive conclusions about whether the 
improved application will suffice for civil rights plaintiffs. Given 
the present uncertainty, the third section of this article provides 
suggestions for the future. It proposes that the Supreme Court, 
the Advisory Committee and Congress expeditiously amend the 
Rule and offers suggestions for judicial enforcement until the 
Rule is revised. 3 
I. EARLY PROBLEMATIC APPLICATION OF RULE 11 
Implementation of the Rule disadvantaged civil rights plain-
tiffs and their counsel for at least five years following the August 
1983 revision.4 Considerable data, gleaned primarily from pub-
lished opinions issued before 1989, support this observation.5 
3. The recent flurry of Rule I I activity and the importance of what is at 
stake in the amendment's application-vindication of fundamental civil rights-
warrant additional examination. Cf Burbank, The Transfonnation of American Civil 
Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, I37 U. PA. L. REV. I925, I925 (1989) (author 
who suffered steady diet of Rule I I for more than year as Reporter of Third 
Circuit Task Force on Rule I I "felt like a character in La Grande Boujfe, a movie 
in which people literally eat themselves to death"). The Advisory Committee 
has undertaken a study that may lead to proposals for change. See infra note 9 I 
and accompanying text. 
4. The early effects of the Rule's implementation have been documented 
elsewhere. In this section I rely most on Tobias, Reassessing Rule I I and Civil 
Rights Cases, 33 How. LJ. I6I (1990); Tobias, supra note I, at 490-507; Vairo, 
Rule I I: A Critical Analysis, I I 8 F.R.D. I 89 (l 988). The early judicial application 
of the Rule does not warrant extensive treatment in this article, because numer-
ous courts and commentators have already examined this enforcement and 
found it to be problematic for both civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys. See, e.g., 
Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d I073, 1085 (7th Cir. I987) 
(Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 
90I (I988); Yancey v. Carroll County, 674 F. Supp. 572, 575 (E.D. Ky. I987), 
ajf 'd, 884 F.2d 58 I (6th Cir. I 989); Tobias, supra note I, at 490-507; Vairo, supra, 
at 200-02, 205, 2I3-I4; Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards/or Rule 11 
Sanctions, IOO HARV. L. REV. 630, 63I (1987). 
5. See S. BURBANK, RULE I I IN TRANSITION (I 989) (report of Third Circuit 
Task Force); Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in 
the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. LJ. I3I3, I338-52 
(I 986); Vairo, supra note 4, at I 99-20 I. The year I 989 is an approximate date to 
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Professors Nelken and Vairo, who each undertook comprehensive 
studies, found that Rule 11 motions were filed and granted 
against civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys much more often than 
against civil rights defendants and their counsel, and that the 
plaintiffs were sanctioned at a higher rate than those who brought 
any other type of federal civil claim.6 A Task Force that analyzed 
all Rule 11 activity in the Third Circuit over a one-year period 
found that courts were considerably more likely to sanction civil 
rights plaintiffs than they were other litigants.7 
Application of the Rule is a two-stage process: determining 
whether it has been violated, and, if so, selecting the appropriate 
sanction. Some judges and numerous commentators asserted 
that judges strictly enforced against civil rights plaintiffs and prac-
titioners the Rule's requirements of reasonable factual investiga-
tions and legal inquiries before filing court papers.8 Yet judges 
apparently applied the mandatory sanctions requirement rather· 
leniently and levied comparatively few large sanctions against civil 
rights plaintiffs and attorneys.9 It does not necessarily follow that 
the judicial implementation had minimal impact on the parties 
and lawyers. For example, courts' selection of monetary assess-
ments as the sanction of choice, combined with substantial awards 
in a small number of civil rights actions, may well have detrimen-
tally affected civil rights litigants and their counsel. 10 
There was considerable lack of consensus in the judicial ap-
plication of the Rule to many significant issues. Courts differed 
which I do not rigidly adhere, and it can vary from circuit to circuit and even 
within districts. 
6. See Nelken, supra note 5, at 1327; Vairo, supra note 4, at 200-01. 
7. See S. BURBANK, supra note 5, at 69. The Task Force studied motions filed 
under the Rule from July 1, 1987, to June 30, 1988, in the five district courts 
within the Third Circuit. It ascertained that in cases in which defendants had 
filed Rule 11 motions, courts sanctioned civil rights plaintiffs 4 7 .1 % of the time 
as compared to 8.45% for plaintiffs in non-civil rights cases. 
8. See, e.g., Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1082-85 (five dense paragraphs and 20 case 
citations necessary to show plaintiff's due process claim "wacky"); Rodgers v. 
Lincoln Towing Serv., 771 F.2d 194, 205-06 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming finding of 
Rule violation although information important to plaintiff's compliance with 
Rule was only available upon discovery); see also Lafrance, Federal Rule 11 and 
Public Interest Litigation, 22 VAL. U.L. REv. 331, 333 (1988) (Rule 11 is antithetical 
to public interest law); Vairo, supra note 4, at 200-02, 213-14 (statistics show 
stricter application in civil rights cases). 
9. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 164; see also Tobias, supra note 1, at 498-501. 
There were a few large sanctions awards, however. See, e.g., Avirgan v. Hull, 705 
F. Supp 1544 (S.D. Fla.) (sanction of$l,000,000), order clarified by 125 F.R.D. 189 
(S.D. Fla. 1989) (attorney and clients jointly and severally liable), appeal docketed, 
No. 89-5515 (11th Cir. May 30, 1989). 
IO. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 165; Tobias, supra note l, at 500-01. 
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over exactly what plaintiffs must do to satisfy the amendment's 
reasonable prefiling inquiry requirements. The courts frequently 
confused the reasonableness of prefiling inquiries with the quality 
of the papers submitted or the merits of the litigation. 11 Judges 
who agreed that civil rights plaintiffs or practitioners had contra-
vened the Rule often disagreed substantially about the proper 
purpose, kind and size of sanctions m similar factual 
circumstances. 12 
Many courts and writers criticized the inconsistent judicial 
implementation of the Rule. For instance, Professor Vairo ob-
served that the consensus that had previously existed in the ap-
pellate courts had begun to unravel by 1986, 13 while Professor 
Burbank found a "conflict between or among circuits on practi-
cally every important question of interpretation and policy under 
the Rule" as recently as early 1989. 14 In one case in which the 
district judge had levied a $1000 sanction, a circuit judge chas-
tised the other members of his panel for suggesting that the lower 
court might exercise its discretion to assess a sanction of 
$10,000-he found a $53,000 award appropriate. 15 There was 
also much unnecessary, costly litigation over issues exogenous to 
the merits of the lawsuits. 16 Concerned that excessively rigid im-
l l. See, e.g., Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 4 79, 485 (3d Cir. l 987); 
Greenberg v. Sala, 822 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1987); see also FED. PROCEDURE 
COMM., SECTION OF LITIG., A.B.A., SANCTIONS: RULE l l AND OTHER POWERS l 8-
l 9 (2d ed. l 988) [hereinafter SANCTIONS]. The papers' quality and the merits of 
the underlying dispute are not irrelevant. The judge, however, should first at-
tempt to ascertain whether the prefiling inquiry was reasonable. Only after such 
an attempt is inconclusive should the judge examine the papers or the merits to 
inform the reasonableness determination. See Burbank, supra note 3, at l 933-34, 
1942, 1948; Tobias, supra note 4, at 168 n.37. 
l 2. See, e.g., Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, Employees 
or Officers, 855 F.2d 1080, l 083, 1093-94 (3d Cir. l 988) (award of$ l 7, l 63 to 
American Legion remanded for recalculation with suggestion that considerable 
reduction appropriate);Johnson v. New York City Transit Auth., 823 F.2d 3 l, 33 
(2d Cir. l 987) (award of $3450 remanded for recalculation); infra note l 5 and 
accompanying text. 
13. See Vairo, supra note 4, at 205-07; accord SANCTIONS, supra note l l, at 14-
16. 
14. Burbank, supra note 3, at 1930-31. 
15. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821F.2d121, 126 (2d 
Cir.) (Pratt. J., dissenting), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (l 987); see also Tobias, supra 
note l, at 499-500 (more thorough treatment of Eastway litigation). Judge Prall 
also chided his colleagues for fostering arbitrary and inconsistent sanctions deci-
sionmaking and for disregarding the Rule's "second purpose"-compensation. 
l 6. Satellite litigation often involved technical issues, such as the meaning 
of the Rule's phraseology, or tangential questions, such as the proper amount of 
attorneys' fees to award. See, e.g., Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs 
Corp., 801F.2d1531, 1540 (1986), dissentfrom denial of en bane reh'g, 809 F.2d 
584 (9th Cir. 1987); Eastway, 821 F.2d 121. 
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plementation of the Rule would foster satellite litigation, one cir-
cuit judge warned that a majority of his panel appeared "almost at 
the point of saying that the main question before the court is not 
'Are you right?' but 'Are you sanctionable?' " 17 
Many civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys have an acute lack of 
time and money. It is important to understand that the Rule's 
vigorous invocation required civil rights attorneys who litigated in 
objective good faith to spend substantial resources defending 
their reputations and their wallets. Resource restraints make 
them particularly susceptible to being chilled by overly enthusias-
tic application of the Rule. 18 One dissenting judge specifically ad-
monished that overzealous, technical application of the Rule 
would chill the most, as well as the least, legitimate civil rights 
action. 19 Some courts championed careful enforcement in civil 
rights cases, apparently evincing concern about chilling,20 while 
others remarked more generally that overzealous application 
could limit the creativity and enthusiasm of civil rights plaintiffs 
and attorneys.21 Numerous commentators concurred with, and 
expanded on, these judicial observations.22 
17. Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1086 (7th Cir. 
1987) (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. dismissed, 485 
U.S. 901 (1988); see also Yancey v. Carroll County, 674 F. Supp. 572, 575 (E.D. 
Ky. 1987) ("I would not be surprised if shortly the Rule 11 tail were wagging the 
substantive law dog in many cases."), aff'd, 884 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1989). More-
over, the Rule's vigorous enforcement may have effectively imposed stricter 
pleading requirements on civil rights plaintiffs, if only to avoid opponents' re-
quests for sanctions. See Tobias, supra note I, at 494; see also Marcus, The Revival 
of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 433, 
449 (1986). 
18. See Letter from Professor George Cochran, University of Mississippi 
School of Law, to addressees working on Rule 11 Project (Mar. 26, 1990) [here-
inafter Letter] (copy on file with author). Although some observers may con-
tend that defending against motions under the Rule is a fixed, fair cost of 
litigating in federal court, it is one that is borne disproportionately by civil rights 
plaintiffs and lawyers, who have little ability to assume the substantial expense. 
19. Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1086 (Cudahy,]., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
20. See, e.g., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc. 836 F.2d 866, 877 (5th Cir. 
1988) (advisory committee note expressly disclaims any intent to chill attorneys' 
enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories); Yancey, 674 F. 
Supp. at 575 (concern about chilling good faith zealous advocacy in civil rights 
litigation); see also Tobias, supra note I, at 506-07. 
21. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1561 (11th Cir. 1987) 
("Nor is Rule 11 intended to chill innovative theories and rigorous advocacy that 
bring about vital and positive changes to the law."); Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 
463, 468 (4th Cir. 1987) (Butzner,J., dissenting) ("Plaintiffs' attorney's creativity 
in seeking to argue the theory of qualified immunity was squarely within the 
scope of Rule 11."); see also Tobias, supra note 4, at 166. 
22. See SANCTIONS, supra note 11, at 23-24 (although not explicitly analyzing 
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II. RECENT JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF RULE 11 
The enforcement of the Rule in civil rights litigation has ap-
parently improved over the past two years and particularly during 
1990.23 During 1990, panels in more than half of the federal cir-
cuits enforced the provision in ways that were solicitous of the 
needs of civil rights plaintiffs and their counsel. 24 This section 
explores whether judicial application actually has been enhanced 
and, if so, whether the improved implementation will suffice for 
effective civil rights enforcement.25 
A. Apparent Improvements in judicial Application 
Each circuit has issued rulings that are solicitous of the needs 
of civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys, and a surprising number 
have been published in the last year.26 Underlying many of these 
civil rights actions); Nelken, supra note 5, at 1338-46; Vairo, supra note 4, at 199-
20 I. Several writers stated that critics' fears that the amendment would chill 
legitimate advocacy were well-founded. See Nelken, supra note 5, at 1339; Vairo, 
supra note 4, at 200. One court and a few commentators asserted that it was 
impossible to determine how many valid lawsuits were abandoned out of con-
cern about expensive satellite litigation or substantial assessments. See Yancey, 
674 F. Supp. at 575; Elson & Rothschild, Rule 11: Objectivity and Competence, 123 
F.R.D. 361, 365 (1988); Vairo, supra note 4, at 201. Considerable anecdotal data 
on threats to sanction civil rights lawyers suggest that the amendment's applica-
tion could have dampened the practitioners' enthusiasm. See Tobias, supra note 
1, at 502, 505 (data gleaned from conversations with civil rights and public inter-
est lawyers); see also Thomas, 836 F.2d at 871 n.4 (quoting Center for Constitu-
tional Rights' memorandum on proposed Rule 11 project) (civil rights attorneys 
believe they were "primary victims of Rule 11 "). These conclusions comport 
with reasonable inferences that might be derived from the Rule's judicial en-
forcement during the applicable period. 
23. The two year period is an approximation, and geographic variations do 
exist. See supra note 5. In this section, I emphasize judicial application during 
1990, supplementing it with earlier examples when appropriate. 
24. Some of the appellate courts have reversed the decisions of district 
judges imposing sanctions on civil rights plaintiffs and warned about the possi-
ble chilling effects of overly stringent application in civil rights cases. See infra 
notes 26-36 and accompanying text. Other circuit courts have deferred to deter-
minations by trial judges that civil rights litigants had not violated Rule 11 and 
to decisions awarding small assessments against those civil rights plaintiffs who 
did contravene the amendment. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. A 
significant number of district courts have evinced special concern for these liti-
gants and lawyers, often finding that plaintiffs pursuing comparatively weak 
claims had not violated the revised provision. See infra notes 46-50 and accom-
panying text. 
25. While judicial application is the focus of this analysis, other considera-
tions, such as the Advisory Committee's activities, are examined where relevant. 
See infra note 91; cf. Tobias, supra note 4, at 167-71 (additional relevant factors). 
26. See Mareno v. Rowe, 910 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 
681 (1991); Alia v. Michigan Supreme Ct., 906 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1990); Davis 
v. Carl, 906 F.2d 533 (11th Cir. 1990); Jenkins v. Missouri, 904 F.2d 415 (8th 
Cir. 1990); Cooper v. City of Greenwood, 904 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1990); Simpson 
1991] RULE 11 IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES 111 
opm1ons is the concern that the imposition of sanctions might 
dampen the enthusiasm of those who pursue civil rights actions. 
A recent Seventh Circuit opinion provides one of the clearest ar-
ticulations of this concern.27 In finding that the trial court's 
award of sanctions was erroneous, the appellate panel stated that 
"Rule 11 cannot be allowed to thoroughly undermine zealous ad-
vocacy. . . . This is especially so in civil rights cases involving 
unpopular clients."28 The court invoked the important admoni-
tion that the Rule was "not intended to chill an attorney's enthu-
siasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories."29 
Other appellate panels recently have demonstrated similar 
reluctance to sanction those who seek to enforce civil rights. For 
instance, vacating a determination that a plaintiff had violated the 
Rule in Title VII litigation, the Fourth Circuit observed: 
Even a vague and conclusory complaint may be "well 
grounded in fact and ... warranted by existing law or a 
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Indeed, if 
Rule 11 permitted sanctions merely on the basis of in-
artful pleading, rather than for a failure to investigate 
the legal and factual basis for that pleading, Rule 12(e) 
motions for a more definite statement would be virtually 
unheard of. 30 
v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1990); Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Banov, 899 F.2d 
40 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Cruz v. Savage, 896 F.2d 626 (lst Cir. 1990); Kraemer v. 
Grant County, 892 F.2d 686 (7th Cir. 1990); O'Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 
F.2d 1465 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 280 (1989); Woodrum v. Woodward 
County, 866 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1989); Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen 
Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1988). 
27. See Kraemer v. Grant County, 892 F.2d 686 (7th Cir. 1990). Kraemer has 
special significance because certain judges on the Seventh Circuit have been the 
strongest proponents of the amendment's vigorous implementation. See, e.g., 
Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 419-20 (7th Cir. 1988); Szabo Food 
Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 
U.S. 901 (1988); Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 
Dist. No. 8, 802 F.2d 247, 255 (7th Cir. 1986); see also S. BURBANK, supra note 5, 
at 59 (suspecting that "iceberg" of unreported Rule 11 decisions is large in Sev-
enth Circuit). 
28. Kraemer, 892 F.2d at 690; accord Greenberg v. Hilton Int'! Co., 870 F.2d 
926, 935 (2d Cir.), vacated, 875 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1989) (remanded for factual 
rehearing); Davis v. Crush, 862 F.2d 84, 92 (6th Cir. 1988). 
29. Kraemer, 892 F.2d at 690 (quoting FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee 
note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 199 (1983)); see also Thomas v. Evans, 880 F.2d 1235, 1240 
(11th Cir. 1989) (also quoting advisory committee note); Woodrum v. Wood-
ward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1989) (indirectly citing same note). 
30. Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33, 36 (4th Cir. 1990). The court also 
found that the Rule was an "inappropriate vehicle for the imposition" of sane-
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Another appeals court similarly remarked that its decision to re-
mand the merits of two of plaintiff's counts to the trial judge for 
additional proceedings was a "strong indication that we do not 
consider these claims 'frivolous and not warranted by the law.' " 31 
Two appellate panels have reversed lower courts' rulings on the 
substantive controversies, which meant that they had to vacate the 
sanctions imposed. 32 
Some of these circuit courts have analyzed very closely the 
plaintiff's prefiling investigations and have occasionally found 
that the trial courts had improperly assessed their reasonable-
ness. 33 Several of the appellate panels have recognized that in 
determining reasonableness it is important to consider the lim-
ited time which civil rights lawyers frequently have for performing 
the prefiling investigations.34 Certain courts have reversed ap-
parently because they simply believed that plaintiffs had satisfied 
the Rule.35 Moreover, a few judges have stated that a finding of 
tions "because of appellant's counsel's 'blatant disregard' for the local rules of 
the district court and for 'his lackadaisical attitude in failing to respond to de-
fendants' Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees.'" Id. at 36-37 (quoting district 
court opinion). Two recent Fourth Circuit opinions, however, evince little solic-
itude for civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers. See Blue v. United States Dep't of the 
Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990),petitionforcert.filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. 
Dec. 17, 1990) (No. 90-1076) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W. 3570); In re Kunstler, 
914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990),petitionsforcert.filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Nov. 
l l, 1990) (No. 90-802) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W. 3465), 59 U.S.L.W. 3406 
(U.S. Nov. 19, 1990) (No. 90-807) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W. 3466), 59 
U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1991) (No. 90-1094) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W. 
3566); see also infra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing Blue and Kunstler). 
31. Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 596 (7th Cir. 
1989), cert. denied, l l l S. Ct. 129 (1990). 
32. See Cooper v. City of Greenwood, 904 F.2d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(district court sanctioned attorney on grounds that reasonable inquiry would 
have shown no property interest in contraband; court of appeals found property 
interest); O'Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 F.2d 1465, 1476 (10th Cir.) (re-
versed district court on constitutionality of night-time execution of warrant), cert. 
denied, 110 S. Ct. 280 (1989); cf. Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 
127 4 ( l 0th Cir. 1989) (observing that two civil rights claims should not have 
been dismissed in context of affirming denial of sanctions). 
33. See, e.g., Mareno v. Rowe, 910 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir. l990);Jenkins v. 
Missouri, 904 F.2d 415, 420-2 l (8th Cir. 1990); Simpson, 900 F.2d at 36-37; Triad 
Assocs., 892 F.2d at 596. 
34. See Jenkins, 904 F.2d at 42 l; Gillette v. Delmore, 886 F.2d 1194, 1199-
200 (9th Cir. 1989) (attorney retained shortly before statute of limitations would 
have run); accord Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 467 (4th Cir. 1987) (Butzner,J., 
dissenting) ("Frequently attorneys must act quickly to meet statutory dead-
lines."); if. Cruz v. Savage, 896 F.2d 626, 633 (lst Cir. 1990) (careful examina-
tion of whether district judge considered reasonableness of lawyer's behavior at 
time lawyer acted). 
35. See, e.g., Jenkins, 904 F.2d at 420-21; Gillette, 886 F.2d at 1200; accord Alia 
v. Michigan Supreme Court, 906 F.2d 1100, 1108 (6th Cir. 1990) (Wellford, J., 
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violation must be based on the "paper as a whole," rather than on 
each allegation.36 A number of circuit courts also have deferred 
to trial court determinations that civil rights plaintiffs had not 
contravened the Rule.37 
Appellate courts also have been solicitous of civil rights 
plaintiffs and attorneys when reviewing the mandatory sanctions 
imposed by lower courts.38 For example, the Fifth Circuit re-
duced the assessment levied on a pro se civil rights litigant from 
$20,000 to $1800.39 The Sixth Circuit characterized the sanction-
ing of civil rights plaintiffs with attorneys' fees as an "extreme 
sanction" that should be employed only in instances of outra-
geous misbehavior.40 Similarly, a First Circuit panel commended 
a trial judge for remembering that "sanctions should not be im-
posed to chill an attorney's enthusiasm, creativity or zealous ad-
vocacy,"41 when the lower court granted $3000 in attorneys' fees 
dissenting) (reversing sanctions 'where "claims were neither unfounded, base-
less, nor made in bad faith .... [They] involv[ ed] difficult and complex issues 
and were in no sense frivolous"). A second member of the three-judge panel 
joinedjudge Wellford's resolution of the sanctions issue, thereby reversing the 
district court. See id. (Boggs, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
36. See Thomas v. Evans, 880 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Rule 11 
does not apply when one prong ... of a claim is deficient, but other prongs 
support ... the pleading or motion."); Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 
1418, 1429 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting sanctions where several of complaint's alle-
gations without foundation). But see Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 
914 F.2d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 1990) (en bane), overruling Murphy v. Business 
Cards Tomorrow, Inc., 854 F.2d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1988) (sanctions rejected 
even if two allegations plainly false, if pleading as whole not frivolous); infra note 
69 and accompanying text. 
37. See, e.g., Perkins v. Spivey, 911 F.2d 22, 36 (8th Cir. 1990) (affirming 
district court's refusal to impose sanctions), cert. denied sub nom. Perkins v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 59 U.S.L.W. 3635 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1991); NAACP Special Con-
tribution Fund v. Atkins, 908 F.2d 336, 340 (8th Cir. 1990) (district court 
correctly denied sanctions because plaintiff's pleadings posed some difficult 
questions); Phelps, 886 F.2d at 1274; Tabrizi v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 883 F.2d 
587, 593 (7th Cir. 1989) (correct to deny sanctions where most of complaint was 
dismissed procedurally); O'Neal v. Dekalb County, 850 F.2d 653, 658 (11th Cir. 
1988) ("We agree with the district court that although the plaintiff's section 
1983 suit does not merit relief, their causes of action were plausible."). 
38. See FED. R. C1v. P. 11 (court "shall impose ... an appropriate sanction, 
which may include ... the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of 
the ... paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee") (emphasis added). 
39. Coats v. Pierre, 890 F.2d 728, 734 (5th Cir. 1989) ($20,000 excessive 
and $1800 sufficient given plaintiff's economic circumstances), cert. denied, 111 S. 
Ct. 70 (1990). 
40. Morrison v. Lipscomb, 877 F.2d 463, 469 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting 
Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1232 (6th Cir. 1986) ("[A]ward of 
attorney's fees against a losing plaintiff in a civil rights action is an extreme sanc-
tion, and must be limited to truly egregious cases of misconduct.")). 
41. Cruz v. Savage, 896 F.2d 626, 634 (1st Cir. 1990). 
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rather than the $40,000 that defendants had requested.42 Some 
appellate judges have recognized the pertinence of a violator's 
ability to pay the sanction imposed and have urged trial courts 
seriously to consider imposing non-monetary assessments.43 
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit, in modifying an earlier panel deci-
sion, has observed that the Rule is "not a fee-shifting statute in 
the sense that the loser pays ... [but] is a law imposing sanctions 
if counsel files with improper motives or inadequate investiga-
tion. "44 Several courts apparently have recognized the resource 
restraints that plague many civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers.45 
Developments in the district courts also merit attention. 
Much of the Rule's application is similar to appellate court en-
forcement.46 For instance, one judge was "reluctant to impose 
Rule 11 sanctions absent egregious conduct" by counsel, because 
42. Cruz v. Savage, 691 F. Supp. 549, 556 (D.P.R. 1988) ("[three thousand 
dollars] is an amount the Court finds suitable for its purposes with respect to the 
specific conduct proscribed in ... Rule l l while still avoiding the impression 
that the sanction is imposed to chill counsel's proper zealous conduct."), ajf"d, 
896 F.2d 626 (lst Cir. 1990). 
43. See, e.g., Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Banov, 899 F.2d 40, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(considering ability to pay and deterence of litigation abuse); Doering v. Union 
County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 195-97 (3d Cir. 1988) (court 
should consider offender's ability to pay as mitigating factor in determining 
amount of monetary sanction); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 
866, 876-8 l (5th Cir. 1988) ("[A]s a less severe alternative to monetary sanc-
tions, district courts may choose to admonish or reprimand attorneys who vio-
late Rule l l."). A four-part formula for calculating sanctions recently 
enunciated by the Tenth Circuit includes many factors solicitous of civil rights 
plaintiffs. See White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 684-85 (10th Cir. 
1990) (court should consider (I) reasonableness of fees requested using tradi-
tional lodestar approach, (2) minimum necessary to deter misconduct, (3) of-
fender's ability to pay, (4) other factors, including offender's experience and 
ability, severity of violation, bad faith and risks of chilling); accord In re Kunstler, 
914 F.2d 505, 523-25 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing White), petitions for cert. filed, 59 
U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Nov. l l, 1990) (No. 90-802) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W. 
3465), 59 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1990) (No. 90-807) (summarized at 59 
U.S.L.W. 3466), 59 U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1991) (No. 90-1094) (summa-
rized at 59 U.S.L.W. 3566). 
44. Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 
1989) (en bane); see Cooter & Gell v. Hartmark Corp., I IO S. Ct. 2447, 2462 
(1990) (Rule 11 not fee-shifting statute); Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Hous. 
Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 596 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting Mars Steel), cert. denied, 111 S. 
Ct. 129 (l 990); see also Hays v. Sony Corp., 84 7 F.2d 412, 419-20 (7th Cir. 1988). 
45. See, e.g., Kraemer v. Grant County, 892 F.2d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 1990); 
Doering, 857 F.2d at 195-97. 
46. Of course, appellate review differs substantially from trial court deci-
sion making. See generally Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2461 (prescribing abuse of 
discretion standard for appellate review of all district court Rule 11 decision-
making); Mars Steel, 880 F.2d at 933-36 (standards for appellate review); Rosen-
berg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
635 (1971). 
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the court did not want to repress efforts to vindicate civil rights 
through the injudicious use of sanctions.47 Another judge re-
fused to sanction a civil rights lawyer and acknowledged that the 
"pressures of filing a timely complaint" were central to ascertain-
ing the reasonableness of a prefiling inquiry.48 Finally, some dis-
trict courts, though sanctioning civil rights litigants, have 
expressed reluctance49 or exercised restraint in assessing the 
sanctions. 50 
There are, however, certain differences in application of the 
Rule at the trial level. Quite a few judges have found that parties 
pursuing arguably weak civil rights claims had not violated the 
amendment.51 Demonstrating appreciation for the pragmatic dif-
ficulties of pleading and proving discrimination cases, two district 
courts have come considerably closer than appellate courts to ar-
ticulating a special, more favorable standard for civil rights 
plaintiffs. 52 
47. Levy v. City of New York, 726 F. Supp. 1446, 1456-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
48. Costello v. Daddario, 710 F. Supp. 1035, 1037-38 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (be-
cause clients could not identify particular officer who assaulted them, counsel 
could not responsibly omit potential defendants in drafting complaint under 
time pressure). 
49. See Goldberg v. Weil, 707 F. Supp. 357, 362 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (court 
reluctant, but ordered pro se plaintiff to pay $400 of defendants' legal fees). 
50. See, e.g., Rice v. Hilto11 Hotel Corp., No. 85-1470, slip op. at 4-5 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 9, 1988) ($5000 awarded despite expenditure of $68,000), ajf'd sub nom. 
Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Banov, 899 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Cruz v. Savage, 691 
F. Supp. 549, 556 (D.P.R. 1988), ajf'd, 896 F.2d 626 (1st Cir. 1990). 
51. See, e.g., Solberg v. Inline Corp., 740 F. Supp. 680, 686 (D. Minn. 1990) 
(plaintiffs suing under new and untested statute did not violate Rule by failing to 
anticipate defense); Moore v. Roth, No. 90Cl097 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 1990) (1990 
WL 60735) (refusing to sanction and permitting filing of amended complaint, 
although if court determined Rule had been violated, plaintiffs' pro se status 
would not insulate them from sanctions); Summer v. Fuller, 718 F. Supp. 1523, 
1525 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (good faith attempt to extend existing law where attorney 
sued district attorney for refusing to allow plaintiff's husband, an assistant dis-
trict attorney, to prosecute case against defendants represented by plaintiff); 
Gordon v. Hercules, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Kan. 1989) (failure to establish 
prima facie case of racial discrimination does not justify sanctions). A few courts 
have granted civil rights plaintiffs' motions for sanctions. See, e.g., Littlefield v. 
Mack, 750 F. Supp. 1395, 1403 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (imposing sanctions on civil 
rights defendant); Byrne v. Board of Educ., 741 F. Supp. 167, 171 (E.D. Wis. 
1990) (defendant's contention that appellate opinions were "at odds with the 
view" of the district court was "not only thin and unconvincing, but also ... 
preposterous and wacky"); cf. United States v. City of San Francisco, 132 F.R.D. 
533, 538 (N .D. Cal. 1990) (because defendant made no good faith argument 
supporting Rule 11 motion, plaintiff intervenors awarded costs of defending 
motion). 
52. See Tutton v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 733 F. Supp. 1113, 1118 
(N.D. Tex. 1990) ("[N]othing in Rule 11 prevents a court qua fact-finder from 
considering the inherent proof difficulties placed upon a discrimination plain-
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In short, this assessment suggests that judicial application 
of the Rule has improved for civil rights plaintiffs and practition-
ers. Several important considerations, however, make it difficult 
to formulate definitive conclusions about this apparent 
improvement. 
B. Qualifications of the Apparent Improvements 
The suggestion of recent improvement in the Rule's enforce-
ment is subject to a number of qualifications. Since January 1989, 
the civil rights bar has continued to voice substantial concern 
over the Rule's enforcement.53 Indeed, one civil rights lawyer re-
cently observed: "It is too late to ask such questions as: is there 
excessive satellite litigation; is imaginative lawyering being chil-
led; are attorney fee awards too often emp,loyed as the sanction of 
choice; has the Rule generated 'unnecessary hostility' among law-
yers; and whether procedural safeguards are in order."54 Numer-
ous judges have not hesitated to find civil rights litigants or their 
lawyers in violation of the Rule,55 and appellate courts have up-
tiff."); Pickens v. Children's Mercy Hosp., 124 F.R.D. 209, 211 (W.D. Mo. 1989) 
("Very little objective circumstantial proof beyond an unfavorable employment 
action is required to save a person making a good faith claim of racial discrimi-
nation from sanctions for filing a frivolous case."). The Tutton court disavowed 
any intent to "engraft judicially on Rule 11 a higher sanction standard in a dis-
crimination case than is found in the text of the Rule." Tutton, 733 F. Supp. at 
1118; cf. Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525, 535 (4th Cir. 
1990) ("It would be an irony if the concept of equality under the law, so funda-
mental to the goal of civil rights, were underwritten with exceptions for Title VII 
litigants from the legal rules that apply to all others."), petition for cert. filed, 59 
U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1990) (No. 90-1076) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W. 
3570). Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1279-81 (2d Cir. 1986) (rejecting 
"special treatment" under the Rule for "attorneys who handle unpopular civil 
rights claims"), cert. denied sub nom. Suffolk County v. Graseck, 480 U.S. 918 
( 1987). See generally supra note 17 (possibility of stricter treatment of civil rights 
plaintiffs). 
53. This claim is premised on conversations with civil rights and public in-
terest attorneys. Their concern had been substantial before. See Tobias, supra 
note 4, at 170 n.46 and accompanying text. 
54. Letter, supra note 18, at 3; see also Nelken, The Impact of Federal Rule 11 on 
lawyers and Judges in the Northern District of California, 74 JUDICATURE 147, 152 
(1990) (recent study finding chilling effects on developments in law); Tobias, 
supra note 4, at 170 n.46 (other anecdotes and telephone conversations concern-
ing chilling); infra note 67 (three troubling cases). 
55. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1494, 1500-01 (S.D. 
Fla. 1989) (sanctions imposed on plaintiff's counsel because two claims against 
three defendants included conclusory allegations which were insufficient to state 
claim for relief, although claim against fourth defendant presented justiciable 
issues of fact), reconsideration denied, 729 F. Supp. 1329 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Goldberg 
v. Weil, 707 F. Supp. 357, 362 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (sanctioning prose plaintiff). For 
examples of decisions refusing to sanction civil rights plaintiffs or attorneys for 
pursuing arguably weak claims, see supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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held sanctions in what appeared to be close cases.56 
There is another important reason not to be overly optimistic 
about the recent improvements in published opinions. Recent 
data on decisionmaking under the Rule demonstrate that approx-
imately ninety percent of it does not appear in the federal re-
porter system and that less than forty percent of it is on 
computerized services.57 The dearth of reported decisions 
thwarts efforts to reach conclusions. It is in the informal setting 
that courts are most likely to apply the Rule in ways that disadvan-
tage civil rights plaintiffs and attomeys,58 and there are numerous 
anecdotal reports of such application. 59 One complaint is that 
judges in chambers threaten to sanction civil rights practitioners 
if they refuse to retract certain substantive claims.60 
Those decisions that are published warrant several other 
56. See, e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 915 F.2d 965, 968 (5th Cir. 1990) (def-
erential appellate review in apparently close case); Jennings v. Joshua Indep. 
School Dist., 869 F.2d 870, 879 (although close case with respect to sanctions 
and, given factual circumstances, panel might have ruled otherwise if sitting as 
district judges, it could not say district court abused its discretion in finding that 
complaint violated Rule), amended and superseded, 877 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(sanction of$84,000 remanded for reconsideration in light of Thomas v. Capital 
Security Services, Inc., 838 F. 2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988) (discussed supra note 20)), 
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3212 (1990). 
57. See S. BURBANK, supra note 5, at 59, 98-99. Substantial differences in 
publication practices exist because courts may base their decision whether to 
publish on a host of considerations, such as concern for a lawyer's reputation, in 
addition to the Rule's principal purpose, which is deterrence. See Thomas v. 
Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 876-81 (5th Cir. 1988) (same as to sanc-
tioning and Rule's purpose); S. BuRB~NK, supra note 5, at 4-6, 44-45, 97 (more 
discussion of problems involved in relying only on reported Rule 11 activity); 
Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 202 
(1985) (helpful treatment of publication and Rule's purposes); Tobias, supra 
note 4, at 169. 
58. Reported decisions are one of the least likely sources in which deleteri-
ous judicial treatment would appear. It would at least be "bad form" to disad-
vantage, much less evince hostility toward, the litigants in print. Some courts 
arguably come close to doing so. See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 897 
F.2d 243, 244 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he interests of black women are probably 
better represented now than they were [in 1984]. By 1984 the United States had 
lost its enthusiasm for quotas."); Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 
F.2d l 073, l 083-85 (7th Cir. 1987) ("The picture is of all tompetitors trying to 
darken the corporate color."), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988). It is much 
easier to take similar action informally. 
59. See Tobias, supra note l, at 502-03 & n.60. Civil rights and public inter-
est attorneys have informed the author of such application. Of course, it is diffi-
cult to document informal activity, because lawyers are justifiably reluctant to 
publicize what they consider improper conduct by judges before whom they reg-
ularly appear. 
60. See Tobias, supra note l, at 502-03 & nn.61-62 (premised on interviews 
with civil rights and public interest attorneys); Tobias, supra note 4, at 170 n.46 
(same). 
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qualifications. Opinions that impose or uphold sanctions may 
have negative effects on parties other than the particular litigants 
involved. Some opinions include language deprecating the ef-
forts of those who seek to enforce civil rights through litigation in 
the federal courts. For example, in Saltany v. Reagan ,61 fifty-five 
Libyan residents and citizens brought suit to recover damages 
sustained during the United States bombing of Libya in 1986.62 
The defendants63 moved to dismiss the claims and for sanctions 
under the Rule. The district court dismissed the claims but de-
nied the motion for sanctions in the interest of maintaining the 
federal court as a forum for litigation pursued as a "public state-
ment of protest of Presidential action with which counsel (and, to 
be sure, their clients) were in profound disagreement."64 The 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia summarily reversed 
and remanded the case with instructions to impose an appropri-
ate sanction, finding that filing a "complaint that 'plaintiffs' attor-
neys surely knew' had 'no hope whatsoever of success'" violated 
the Rule.65 The court of appeals did "not conceive it a proper 
function of a federal court to serve as a forum for 'protests,' to the 
detriment of parties with serious disputes waiting to be heard. "66 
The case could prove problematic for civil rights plaintiffs insofar 
as a considerable amount of civil rights litigation is in some sense 
a "public statement of protest."67 
61. Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (Buckley, 
D. Ginsburg and Sentelle, lJ.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2172 (1990). See generally 
D'Amato, The Imposition of Attorney Sanctions for Claims Arising from the U.S. Air Raid 
on Libya, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 705 (1990) (criticizing Saltany). 
62. Saltany, 886 F.2d at 439. 
63. The defendants were the President of the United States, the Prime Min-
ister of the United Kingdom, the two nations themselves and others. See Saltany 
v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319, 320 (D.D.C. 1988), rev 'din part and ajf"d in part, 886 
F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2172 (1990). 
64. Saltany, 886 F.2d at 439 (quoting Saltany, 702 F. Supp. at 322). The 
district court had concluded: "It cannot, therefore, be said that the case is frivo-
lous so much as it is audacious." Saltany, 702 F. Supp. at 322. 
65. Saltany, 886 F.2d at 440 (quoting Saltany, 702 F. Supp. at 322). 
66. Id. 
67. Saltany, 702 F. Supp. at 322. In addition to Saltany, three cases at vari-
ous stages in the appellate process, unless modified, will disadvantage civil 
rights plaintiffs and their counsel. The appeal of a $1,000,000 sanction imposed 
on a non-profit public interest entity is pending in the Eleventh Circuit. See Avir-
gan v. Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544, 1545 (S.D. Fla.) (court found counsel's allega-
tions unsubstantial), order clarified, 125 F.R.D. 189 (S.D. Fla.) (attorney and 
clients jointly and severally liable), appeal docketed, No. 89-5515 (11th Cir. May 
30, 1989). Avirgan could be said to resemble Saltany in that it represents a pro-
test against allegedly improper American political activity in Latin America. 
Oral argument inAvirgan was scheduled for the week of February 25, 1991. Tel-
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Moreover, courts do not always display an appreciation of 
certain important subtleties involved in applying the Rule to civil 
rights cases. For example, even judges who have written a 
number of the clearer decisions continue to employ a "product" 
approach to possible violations rather than focusing on the con-
duct of litigants and lawyers.68 A few courts that emphasized the 
quality of the papers tendered by the plaintiffs have subjected to 
scrutiny each count, claim or allegation.69 
Numerous judges have been insufficiently attentive to the 
needs of civil rights plaintiffs in choosing the appropriate sanction 
ephone interview with Joanne Royce, Litigation Department, Christie Institute, 
Washington, D.C. Uan. 22, 1991) (plaintiff's counsel). 
In the other two cases, the Fourth Circuit has affirmed findings of Rule l l 
violations but vacated and remanded the sanctions determinations as inappro-
priate. See Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1384-93 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (sanc-
tion of $84,000 levied in employment discrimination litigation), vacated in part on 
reconsideration, 123 F.R.D. 204 (E.D.N.C. 1988), ajf'd in part, vacated and remanded 
in part sub nom. Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 
1990) (affirming finding of Rule violation, vacating and remanding sanctions de-
termination), petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1990) (No. 90-
1076) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W. 3570); Robeson Defense Comm. v. Britt, 132 
F.R.D. 650 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (sanction of $122,834 imposed in civil rights litiga-
tion involving Native Americans and African Americans in Robeson County), 
ajf'd in part, vacated and remanded in part sub nom. In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th 
Cir. 1990) (affirming finding of Rule violation, vacating and remanding sanc-
tions determination), petitions/or cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Nov. l l, 1990) 
(No. 90-802) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W. 3465), 59 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Nov. 
19, 1990) (No. 90-807) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W. 3466), 59 U.S.L.W. 3503 
(U.S. Jan. 8, 1991) (No. 90-1094) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W. 3566). 
68. Judges who adopt the "product" approach fail to emphasize the reason-
ableness of prefiling inquiries and instead concentrate on the quality of the pa-
pers submitted or the merits of lawsuits. See S. BURBANK, supra note 5, at 46; see, 
e.g., Mareno v. Rowe, 910 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir. 1990) (emphasizing merits); 
Davis v. Carl, 906 F.2d 533, 535-36 ( l l th Cir. 1990) (same); Triad Assocs., Inc. 
v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 596 (7th Cir. 1989) (sanctions determina-
tion rested on merits of suit as measure of reasonableness of prefiling inquiry), 
cert. denied, l l l S. Ct. 129 (1990); Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 
1429 (9th Cir. 1989) (that some allegations made at litigation's outset later 
proved unfounded did not render frivolous complaint that also included some 
nonfrivolous claims); Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, Em-
ployees or Officers, 855 F.2d 1080, 1091 (3d Cir. 1988) (filing of claim was le-
gally frivolous); see also supra note l l. 
69. See Frantz v. United States Powerlifting Fed'n, 836 F.2d 1063, 1067 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (in antitrust case, "each [claim] must be investigated and researched 
before filing"); PaineWebber, Inc. v. Can 'Am Fin. Group, Ltd., 12 l F.R.D. 324, 
330 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ("Rule l l applies to every statement and claim in a paper"), 
ajf'd, 885 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Melrose v. Shearson/American Ex-
press, Inc., 898 F.2d 1209, 1215-16 (7th Cir. 1990) ("It ... is neither contrary to 
the language of Rule l l as amended, nor an abuse of discretion for the district 
court to undertake such a detailed [point-by-point] analysis [of a pleading or 
motion] when the court believes the circumstances warrant it."); Triad Assocs., 
892 F.2d at 596-97; supra note 36 and accompanying text (especially Ninth Cir-
cuit cases). 
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for contravention of the Rule. For instance, some courts have not 
specifically considered a plaintiff's ability to pay or the difference 
between monetary and non-monetary awards.70 Similarly, they 
have not attempted to impose the "least severe sanction" neces-
sary to achieve the Rule's purposes. 71 These factors suggest that 
too few members of the federal bench fully understand the impli-
cations of their Rule 11 enforcement for civil rights plaintiffs. 72 
Another important qualification is that substantial variations 
exist within and among the circuits and probably will persist.73 
Differently constituted panels in the same circuit may issue quite 
dissimilar Rule 11 opinions. 74 The uncertainty is exacerbated be-
cause there is slight chance of convincing a court to grant rehear-
70. See, e.g., West Coast Theater Corp. v. City of Portland, 897 F.2d 1519 
(9th Cir. 1990) (no analysis of proper type of sanction or party's ability to pay); 
Jennings v. Joshua Indep. School Dist., 869 F.2d 871 (5th Cir.) (same), amended 
and superseded, 877 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1989) (remanded to insure justification 
corresponded to amount, type and effect of sanctions imposed), cert. denied, 110 
S. Ct. 3212 (1990). 
71. See, e.g., Triad Assocs., 892 F.2d at 596-97 (approving district court's 
monetary sanctions without analyzing appropriateness of other sanctions); cf. 
Jennings, 877 F.2d at 322 (remanding to district court for imposition of least se-
vere sanction). For a discussion of appropriate sanctions and examples of cases 
considering the matter, see supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text. 
72. For example, the parties may be discouraged nearly as much by the pos-
sibility of costly satellite litigation as by the imposition of sanctions. See supra 
note I; Tobias, supra note I, at 50 I n.57. For examples of courts that have rec-
ognized the threat satellite litigation poses to litigants with few resources, see 
supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
73. See S. BURBANK, supra note 5, at 46, 96-97; T. WILLGING, THE RULE 11 
SANCTIONING PROCESS 178-89 (1988). Certain difficulties, such as predicting 
trends in civil litigation and the future composition of the federal bench, obvi-
ously complicate prognostication. 
74. Indeed, in some circuits the panel might be insensitive or even hostile. 
Compare Kraemer v. Grant County, 892 F.2d 686 (7th Cir. 1990) (Wood, Cudahy 
and Ripple, JJ.) with Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073 
(7th Cir. 1987) (Cudahy, Posner and Easterbrook, JJ.), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 
901 (1988) and Dreis & Krump Mfg. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 802 
F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1986) (Cummings, Posner and Gordon,JJ.). For those who 
think the Seventh Circuit is anomalous, compare the treatment given Julius 
Chambers in Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 
1990) (Ervin, C.j. and Phillips and Wilkinson, JJ.), petition for cert. filed, 59 
U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1990) (No. 90-1076) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W. 
3570), with the treatment accorded William Kunstler, Barry Nakell and William 
Pitts in In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990) (Chapman, Wilkinson and 
Wilkins, JJ.), petitions for cert. filed., 59 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1990) (No. 
90-802) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W. 3465), 59 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Nov. 19, 
1990) (No. 90-807) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W. 3466), 59 U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. 
Jan. 8, 1991) (No. 90-1094) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W. 3566). 
In addition to differences in judicial perspectives on the Rule's application, 
significant differences among litigators in their views of the risks and benefits of 
seeking sanctions contribute to variations in the Rule's invocation and 
application. 
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ing en bane. 15 
Similar uncertainty and inconsistency exist at the district 
court level.76 A substantial amount of the apparently enhanced 
judicial enforcement has been in those large urban districts that 
have experienced much of the Rule activity to date.77 Even in 
those districts, however, uncertainty exists. 78 Moreover, 
favorable rulings by a few judges in the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania or the Southern District of New York79 mean little to liti-
gants outside those districts or within the districts but before a 
different judge.80 Too few courts have actually implemented the 
75. For example, in Kunst/er the Fourth Circuit took just nine days before 
unanimously rejecting the petition for rehearing en bane. Telephone interview 
with Professor Barry Nakell, University of North Carolina School of Law (Oct. 
30, 1990) (attorney for plaintiff in Kunst/er). See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. 
Burroughs Corp., 809 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1987) (five judges dissenting from de-
nial of rehearing en bane); Mcfeeley, En Banc Proceedings in the United States Courts 
of Appeals, 24 IDAHO L. REv. 255 (1987-88) (statistics show little chance of en 
bane disposition). See generally Bartlett ex rel. Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 
1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("It is an enormous distraction to break into [the court's] 
schedule and tie up the entire court to hear one case en bane.") (emphasis in origi-
nal), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 940 (1988). 
Several circuits have issued en bane determinations to clarify sanctions deci-
sionmaking within their jurisdictions. See, e.g., Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental 
Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 1989) ("We heard this case en bane to 
achieve harmony."); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 868 (5th 
Cir. 1988) ("In view of the high import of Rule 11 to both the bench and the bar, 
this Court took the instant case en bane to resolve any inconsistencies ... in this 
Circuit."); Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1987) ("This 
court took this case en bane to consider procedures and standards for the imposi-
tion of sanctions under Rule 11. "). 
76. For a discussion of Rule 11 developments in the district courts, see 
supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text. 
77. See Vairo, supra note 4, at 200 (almost one-third of reported cases arose 
out of districts covering New York City and Chicago). The Northern District of 
California, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Southern District of 
Florida also have experienced considerable Rule 11 activity. 
78. For example, there are very few opinions solicitous of civil rights plain-
tiffs issued by judges in the Northern District of California or the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida, both districts with considerable Rule 11 activity. But see United 
States v. City and County of San Francisco, 132 F.R.D. 533, 537 (N.D. Cal. 
1990). 
79. For examples of rulings from these districts, see supra notes 47-48 and 
accompanying text. 
80. For instance, recent enforcement of the Rule by certain judges in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania has been solicitous of civil rights plaintiffs and 
attorneys. See, e.g., Costello v. Daddario, 710 F. Supp. 1035, 1037-38 (E.D. Pa. 
1989) (Pollak, J.) (discussed supra note 48 and accompanying text); Smith v. Phil-
adelphia School Dist., 679 F. Supp. 4 79, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (VanArtsdalen, j.) 
(where learning impaired student sued for failure to provide individualized edu-
cation, court found plaintiff's theory untenable but did "not regard the mere 
filing ... on this untenable theory to be so completely lacking in merit ... or in 
factual or legal support as to impose sanctions"); see also Doering v. Union 
County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 195-97 (3d Cir. 1988) (by 
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recent improvements in meaningful ways. 
Other developments in related areas may exacerbate the ef-
fect of imposing Rule 11 sanctions on civil rights plaintiffs and 
their counsel. Quite important is the Supreme Court's recent ar-
ticulation of a deferential standard for appellate review of district 
court application of the Rule.81 The Court also has read Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 68 and 23(e) in conjunction with the 
Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act82 in ways that could fur-
ther deplete the already small pool of lawyers who have the 
wherewithal to assume the mounting risks of representing dis-
crimination victims. 83 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
Analysis of Rule 11 activity indicates that judicial implemen-
implication, courts may consider non-monetary sanctions); S. BURBANK, supra 
note 5, at 37 (Third Circuit has repeatedly emphasized availability of non-mone-
tary sanctions). Despite these developments, the Third Circuit Task Force was 
"surprised" to find that the "sanctions imposed in reported cases are usually 
monetary, and usually require payment to another party." Id. at 36; see supra 
note 7 and accompanying text (discussing Task Force and its findings). 
Inconsistent enforcement by different courts may be explained by the diffi-
culty of applying the reasoning of the recent opinions which include suggestions 
for enforcement. The best example of this phenomenon is the difficulty courts 
have in according proper emphasis to the reasonableness of prefiling inquiries 
rather than to the papers' quality or the merits. See supra notes 68-69 and accom-
panying text; see also Tobias, supra ncite l, at 510-17 (problems of clarity, transla-
tion and transferability). 
81. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2461 (1990). 
The Court held that the courts of appeals should apply an abuse of discretion 
standard to all aspects of district court Rule 11 determinations. Cf Crabtree v. 
Muchmore, 904 F.2d 1475, 1479 (10th Cir. 1990) (district court abused its dis-
cretion in not awarding attorneys' fees under the Rule to defendants in civil 
rights case). The Court also resolved a conflict among the courts of appeals by 
holding that district courts could not award costs of appeals under the Rule. 
Cooter, 110 S. Ct. at 24 (determination is for courts of appeals under FED. R. APP. 
P. 38). 
82. Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 
Stat. 2641 (1976), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). For a discussion of litiga-
tion financing and the problems posed by these interpretations of the Fees Act 
and Rules 23(e) and 68, see Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 310-19 (1989). 
83. See Evans v.JeffD., 475 U.S. 717 (1986) (Rule 23(e) requires judicial 
approval of class action settlements, and district courts may approve settlements 
waiving attorneys' fees otherwise available under§ 1988); Marek v. Chesny, 473 
U.S. ·l (1985) (Rule 68 provides that if final judgment is not more favorable than 
pretrial settlement offer, offeree must assume own post-offer costs, which in-
clude§ 1988 attorneys' fees); cf. Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 65 l, 660 
(4th Cir. 1990) (Title VII case in which defendant "instituted an extensive com-
pany-wide anti-sexual harassment policy ... at least partially in response to" 
plaintiff's suit but plaintiff recovered only $1 in nominal damages, under Marek 
plaintiff had to assume $330,000 in post-offer fees incurred). 
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tation in civil rights cases has improved since the beginning of 
1989. During 1990, relatively few reported opinions seriously 
disadvantaged civil rights plaintiffs or practitioners. The substan-
tial qualifications described above, however, prevent the conclu-
sion that no additional change in the Rule is needed. What 
federal judges and those institutions possessing authority to alter 
the rules should do, however, remains quite controversial. 
A. Possible Amendment 
The Supreme Court, the Advisory Committee on the Civil 
Rules and Congress should promptly revise the Rule in ways that 
are responsive to civil rights plaintiffs and their counsel. The en-
tities with rule-amending responsibilities should remember that a 
number of the Rule's primary objectives, namely prompting law-
yers to "stop and think" before filing papers and reducing abuse 
of the litigation process, have been substantially accomplished.84 
These purposes and additional goals that have not been achieved 
fully can be attained nearly as effectively with other measures, 
such as judicial case management.85 The essential role that civil 
rights litigation plays in reducing discrimination in the United 
States makes the risks of not amending the Rule too substantial. 
Courts, commentators and critics have offered a multitude of 
cogent suggestions for change that need not be comprehensively 
recounted here. One example is Professor Nelken's proposal for 
modifications that would emphasize the sufficiency of prefiling in-
quiries and limit the importance of attorneys' fees as an appropri-
ate sanction.86 This suggestion was primarily intended to reduce 
the Rule's chilling effects, especially in civil rights actions. Other 
recommendations have included reinstituting the Rule's pre-1983 
formulation or awarding attorneys' fees only upon a showing that 
violators have abused the civil litigation process or acted in bad 
faith. 87 Some critics have even championed Rule 11 's repeal.88 
That prospect still warrants serious consideration, although it 
84. See, e.g., T. WILLGING, supra note 73, at 11-12; Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revis-
ited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1014-15 (1988). 
85. See, e.g., SANCTIONS, supra note 11, at 16, 24-25; Vairo, supra note 4, at 
233. 
86. Professor Nelken proposed changes both in the Rule's text and in its 
accompanying advisory committee note. See Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Him-
self in the Foot? Looking for a Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 HASTINGS LJ. 
383, 385, 405-08 ( 1990). 
87. See, e.g., SANCTIONS, supra note 11, at 2-3, 24-25; see also Tobias, supra 
note 1, at 524; Vairo, supra note 4, at 233; infra note 90. 
88. See, e.g., Lafrance, supra note 8, at 352-58; Tobias, supra note I, at 524. 
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may be too draconian for some, including numerous individuals 
who are responsible for possible amendment.89 
B. Additional Study Is Unnecessary 
Additional analysis should not be a prerequisite to informed 
amendment. Those with rule-revising power presently have suffi-
cient information on which to base rational determinations re-
garding the Rule's possible amendment. Nevertheless, in 
February 1990,Judge Grady, then Chair of the Advisory Commit-
tee, denominated numerous areas that he considered appropriate 
for future study.90 The Advisory Committee announced in Au-
gust 1990 that it was undertaking a study of the Rule that may 
lead to proposals for change in April 1991.91 The Americanjudi-
cature Society also recently commenced an assessment of activity 
89. Those responsible for amendment simply seem unamenable to such a 
substantial change, especially in light of the rather widespread belief, particu-
larly in the federal judiciary, that much litigation abuse remains to be deterred 
and that the Rule is a valuable tool for doing so. See infra notes 90-91, I 02 and 
accompanying text. 
90. See Letter from Judge John Grady to Representative Robert Kas-
tenmeier (Feb. 9, 1990) [hereinafter Letter] (on file with author). Representa-
tive Kastenmeier was the Chair of the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual 
Property and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee. 
Judge Grady also asserted that the 1983 "amendments were, after all, addressed 
to what was perceived to be a serious problem of litigation abuse." 
91. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States, Call for Written Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Related Rules, 13 l F.R.D. 335 (l 990) [hereinafter Call 
for Comments]. The Committee requested that the bench, the bar and the public 
submit written comments on the Rule's operation by November I, stated that it 
would hold a public hearing to receive oral testimony in February, 199 l, and 
suggested that it might propose changes in the Rule at the Committee's regu-
larly scheduled meeting in April 1991. It also commissioned an Empirical study 
of Rule l l by the Federal Judicial Center. See id. at 345. 
The prospect of actual revision remains too nascent to warrant substantial 
treatment in this article. The Committee's indication of interest is only the first 
step in what could be a lengthy revision process. See generally Lewis, The Excessive 
History of Federal Rule 15( c) and lts Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 85 MICH. L. REV. 
1507 (l 987) (comprehensive analysis of inefficiencies in process of rules revi-
sion). The mere indication of interest does not mean that the Rule actually will 
be amended. The Committee has already indicated that it may choose not to 
proceed beyond the hearing stage. See Call/or Comments, supra, at 345. 
Even if the process continues beyond the hearing stage, problems will re-
main. If the adverse effects on civil rights enforcement result from the Rule as 
applied, not as written, only significant revisions are likely to confer much bene-
fit. The Committee is unlikely to suggest substantial rewriting or changes that 
would significantly help civil rights plaintiffs. Finally, whatever amendment the 
Committee suggests probably would not become effective for several years. All 
of these considerations warrant minimal treatment in this article of the Commit-
tee's expression of interest and an emphasis on judicial application. 
1991] RULE 11 IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES 125 
under the Rule in the Second, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits.92 
Conditioning amendment of the Rule on completion of these 
studies is unnecessary. There presently exists a base of informa-
tion considerably larger and more sophisticated than the one on 
which the rule-amending authorities premised the 1983 revi-
sion. 93 Studies have already established that sanctions have been 
sought from, and imposed upon, civil rights plaintiffs at high 
rates.94 Accumulating anecdotal evidence on informal activity 
under the Rule complements these findings.95 Moreover, addi-
tional studies will not completely overcome the principal difficulty 
with previous studies-the general unavailability of information 
on much Rule 11 activity, particularly that which is informal. The 
data that are likely to be the most informative are also the hardest 
to secure, document and synthesize in ways that generate sup-
portable conclusions.96 
If the Advisory Committee determines that additional study 
is necessary, it should capitalize on prior work. Further inquiry 
will consume money and time. The cost of the information, es-
pecially when there is concern over federal spending, may be 
prohibitively high. Moreover, while the studies proceed, disad-
vantageous judicial application of the Rule will continue to im-
pose significant costs on civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys who 
cannot afford the expense. Therefore, future study should build 
on what has come before. The Third Circuit Task Force has pro-
vided numerous valuable ideas about precisely what constitutes 
civil rights litigation, which Rule 11 activity should be analyzed, 
and how evaluations ought to be performed.97 A 1988 report by 
92. See American Judicature Society Rule 11 Project (1990) (copy on file 
with author). 
93. See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1927-28; Letter, supra note 18, at 3. Cer-
tain ironies are implicated here. For instance, proponents of the 1983 amend-
ment, which was based substantially on anecdotal information, now seem to be 
demanding that critics who seek to change it not be permitted to rely on such 
information but be required to make very substantial showings. See Letter, supra 
note 90, at 1-2; see also Miller, The New Certification Standard Under Rule 11, 130 
F.R.D. 479, 505-06 (1990). 
94. See, e.g., supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. 
95. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. 
96. For example, few district judges will admit that they threatened to sanc-
tion civil rights lawyers who refused to withdraw certain substantive claims. See 
supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. Correspondingly, a civil rights attor-
ney might believe that a court was threatening to impose a sanction, although 
the judge actually intended to issue a warning in an attempt to minimize sanc-
tions should they be levied. It is difficult to distinguish improper threats from 
appropriate or even beneficial warnings. See Tobias, supra note l, at 502 n.60. 
97. See S. BURBANK, supra note 5, at 4-6, 44-45, 68-72, 96-99. 
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the Federal Judicial Center has been another helpful source of 
suggestions, particularly for securing geographically diverse data 
and detecting potential chilling.9s 
C. judicial Application 
Barring dramatic change, such as the highly improbable 
prospect of congressional legislation exempting civil rights litiga-
tion from Rule 11 sanctions, 99 the manner in which the Rule is 
applied will remain important to effective enforcement of civil 
rights in this country. Federal judges should seriously consider 
curtailed enforcement of the Rule evident in some jurisdic-
tions.100 The courts might follow the suggestions of certain 
Third Circuit judges that the Rule's application be restricted to 
exceptional situations, such as those involving misuse of the liti-
gation process. 101 
Courts that wish to continue enforcing the Rule broadly, out 
of a belief that abuse of the process of civil litigation remains 
widespread, 102 should keep in mind when resolving sanctions mo-
tions the factors discussed throughout this paper, particularly 
civil rights plaintiffs' dearth of resources and vulnerability to chil-
ling. Central to judicial analysis should be the reasonableness of 
prefiling inquiries; courts should remember that civil rights plain-
tiffs and attorneys typically have limited time and money for per-
forming their investigations. 103 If a court finds that a litigant or 
lawyer has contravened the Rule, it should take into account the 
violator's ability to pay and carefully consider the possibility of 
levying non-monetary sanctions. The imposition of attorneys' 
fees should be the "sanction of last resort." 104 
98. See T. WILLGING, supra note 73, at 8- l 0, 15-19, 160-63, 168, 179-89; cf. 
Tobias, supra note 4, at 176-79 (additional suggestions). 
99. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text. Congress's recent failure 
to override President Bush's veto of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 makes the pros-
pect of enacting an exemption unlikely. See President's Veto of Rights Measure Sur-
vives by One Vote, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25. 1990, at Al, col. 3; see also New Battle 
Looming as Democrats Reintroduce Civil Rights Measure, N.Y. Times.Jan. 4, 1991, at 
Al2, col. l (House Democrats reintroduced civil rights bill significantly tougher 
than one President vetoed). 
100. See Tobias, supra note l, at 513-17. 
IOI. See, e.g., Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 
F.2d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 1988); Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 483-85 (3d 
Cir. 1987). 
102. See Schwarzer, supra note 84; Tobias, supra note 4, at 180-81. 
103. See supra notes l, 34 and accompanying text. 
104. See, e.g., Morrison v. Lipscomb, 877 F.2d 463, 469 (6th Cir. 1989) (cit-
ing Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1232 (6th Cir. 1986)); Doering, 
857 F.2d at 194-97. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Federal judicial enforcement of Rule 11 has adversely af-
fected civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers since the Rule was 
amended in August 1983. Numerous courts recently have en-
hanced the quality of their formal decisionmaking under the re-
vised provISion, and judges should similarly apply the 
amendment in the future. It remains impossible to ascertain, 
however, whether the apparent improvements will suffice for civil 
rights plaintiffs and practitioners, principally because the enforce-
ment most detrimental to them has been informal. Because civil 
rights litigation plays a significant role in American society, the 
Supreme Court, the Advisory Committee and Congress should 
expeditiously revise the Rule. Until they do, courts should apply 
the amendment in ways that are solicitous of the needs of civil 
rights plaintiffs and attorneys. 
